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BOOK REVIEWS

A VERY OLD KIND OF WAR
Ledeen, Michael A. The War against the Terror Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002. 262pp. $24.95

Some twenty years ago, en route to a Gulf
deployment, this reviewer and other
watchstanders received various briefings
on how to defend against Harpoons and
other U.S. weapons sold to the newly
hostile Iranians. This occasioned more
than a little angry puzzlement at how we
found ourselves in such a situation, but we
had no uncertainty about who the foe was.
Today, the United States once again faces
conflict in the wider Mideast region, including the Gulf. Again we have foes that
use our own tools against us (e.g., airliners as cruise missiles). However, unlike
then, today we arguably face a fundamental confusion about who the enemy
is and what this war is about. This makes
it extraordinarily difficult to know what
to plan and execute against or to know the
overall campaign context for individual
combat operations. Ultimately, such confusion is a formula for failure in this war.
In The War against the Terror Masters,
Mike Ledeen, noted political analyst,
Middle East scholar, and frequent contributor to the Wall Street Journal and
other media outlets, presents a compelling picture of what the threat actually is,
how it developed, and how the United
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States can and must defeat it. He avers
that this war is not a “global war on terrorism” at all but is specifically about Islamic, not generic, terrorism—motivated
and underwritten by militant Islamic
fundamentalism and abetted by many regional regimes. However, many in the
West are most reluctant to frame the
conflict this way, for fear of being accused of “engaging in a war against Islam.” Ledeen’s account thus is quite
“politically incorrect,” but as one European leader recently (and encouragingly)
noted, “to solve a problem, you must
start by giving it a proper name.”
President Bush, in his earliest “post–9/11”
speeches to the nation, emphasized that
the United States must wage war against
the terrorists and the countries that support
or harbor them, recognizing immediately
that major terrorist organizations would
be crippled absent state support. However,
in the ensuing year this crucial distinction
was largely honored in the breach. With
the notable exception of Afghanistan, the
emphasis has almost exclusively been on
fighting terrorists, not their state facilitators. Much of the senior leadership of the
Department of State, the CIA, and the
U.S. military, as well as most European
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elites, consider terrorists primarily as
criminals and therefore urge a legal paradigm, or crime-fighting approach, perhaps with selective military assistance,
rather than actual warfighting. The consequence arguably has been a dangerously
lethargic campaign of which the ultimate
objectives remain vague and uncertain.
The conventional wisdom is that the
United States is engaged in a totally new
kind of war against clandestine organizations rather than nation-states.
Ledeen argues compellingly that this is
at best partially true. Rather, “our
prime enemies are the terror masters—
the rulers of the countries that sponsor
terrorism, and the leaders and soldiers
of the terrorist organizations themselves.” Moreover, “the main part of the
war—the campaign against the terror
masters who rule countries hostile to
us—is a very old kind of war . . . a
revolutionary war, right out of the eighteenth century, the very kind of war
that gave us our national identity.”
Ledeen starts by asking “why it happened,” and recounts how the (Islamic)
terror network developed, from the
start of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to today’s al-Qa‘ida, including “an analysis of the importance
of Islamic fundamentalism within the
terror network, as well as the crucial
roles of several Middle Eastern regimes.” He argues that the al-Qa‘ida
and other Islamic terrorist groups have
a fanatical desire to destroy the West,
based on “a deep-seated Muslim rage
and buttressed by a powerful Muslim
doctrine. Without the rage and the doctrine—the ideology of the terror masters—there might be Islamic terrorists
(there have been for centuries) but
there would not be the global Islamic
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terrorist network, resting on an Islamic
fundamentalist mass movement.”
Ledeen then poses the equally important question, “Why weren’t we properly prepared?” He notes the woeful
record of U.S. policy making and intelligence vis-à-vis terrorism and the Middle East since the late 1970s, when
American policy makers failed to
understand the epochal nature of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s triumph in Iran.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a long, compounding litany of disasters and missed
opportunities. Some were due to bureaucratic dysfunctionality and poor
communications among various organizations, while others were results of
deliberate, ideologically based castration of agencies like the FBI and CIA
throughout much of the 1990s, when
weltfremd policy decisions left the “CIA
as a cross between the Post Office and
the Department of Agriculture,” in the
words of one senior CIA official. However, many mistakes stemmed from a
fundamental misunderstanding of
“human nature and the true nature of
human history”—in essence, for a variety of reasons, U.S. policy makers
consistently fooled themselves about
the reality of the threat. Progress is
being made to correct some of the
egregious flaws, but again, the pace
is slow.
Lastly, Ledeen asks “How will we win?”
He notes that if the key terror masters
are in fact the rulers of their countries,
the United States must defeat those regimes in some meaningful sense if it is
to prevail. Noting these regimes’ fragility, he suggests bringing them down will
help the United States “show the Muslims that they have been led astray by the
terror masters, that they should look
within themselves for the source of
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their centuries-long failure, and that
the best hope for them lies in cooperation with the civilized world and in
greater freedom for all their people.”
This can be characterized as a “revolutionary war against the tyrants,” one
“entirely in keeping with our own national tradition of fighting tyranny.”
The War against the Terror Masters is a
book that U.S. military leaders should
read as a matter of urgency in order to
understand the deadly threat that confronts the United States and its armed
forces. The confusion about whether
the United States is fighting terrorists
or a much more formidable phenomenon, militant Islamic fundamentalism,
is exacting a heavy toll. Though the cost
has been paid largely in terms of international political support through late
2002, arguably America has been very
lucky that it has not been reckoned in
lives and destruction from another
large-scale atrocity. It is little wonder
that Mike Ledeen for months has ended
his newspaper columns with “Faster
please,” and more recently, “Faster
please. What are you waiting for? Another September 11th?”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy

Hoffman, Frank G. Homeland Security: A Competitive Strategies Approach. Washington, D.C.:
Center for Defense Information, 2002. 67pp. (no
price given)
O’Hanlon, Michael E., et al. Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
188pp. $17.95

Since the events of 11 September 2001, a
multitude of homeland defensive plans
have been discussed at every level of
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government and the military, centering
on the restructuring of existing organizations or increased financing. Each plan
focuses on a single phase or group believed to be essential to the safety of our
nation. These two books for review take
different approaches. Homeland Security:
A Competitive Strategies Approach, by
Frank G. Hoffman, stays out of the tactical and operational level of the “war”
and focuses on the strategic level and the
planning cycle. Protecting the American
Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, by
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag,
Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L.
Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James B.
Steinberg, analyzes the problems of national security, determines the progress
of current programs, and designs an
agenda for future endeavors.
Homeland Security offers a process to
enhance U.S. capabilities through a
simple “course of action” analysis based
on comparisons of known and perceived threats with strategies used by
policy makers in recent history. The authors envision three possible categories
of attacks against the United States. The
first is a missile attack, from intercontinental ballistic missiles or cruise missiles; the second is covert attack or
catastrophic terrorism, involving an array of weapons of mass destruction
smuggled into the United States; finally,
they consider a cyber attack designed to
destroy the U.S. information infrastructure. Each method is considered in
terms of known and projected capabilities of national and transnational players, and of the four classic strategies of
nonproliferation, deterrence, counterproliferation, and preemption. Each
“style” has been filtered through these
four perspectives to discern strengths
and weaknesses.
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